Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Kelly Howard v. Robert E. Buhler : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Donald J. Purser; M. Taylor Florence; Purser, Overholt and Okazaki; Attorneys for Respondent.
Robert B. Hansen; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Howard v. Buhler, No. 890073 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1577

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.

BRIEF

INi THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

KELLY HOWARD,
Appellant,
Case No. 890073
v.
(Priority Order - 14b)
ROBERT E. BUHLER,
Respondent.

APPEAL
From the Order of the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
State of Utah
Honorable James S. Sawaya

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Donald J. Purser
M. Taylor Florence
PURSER, OVERHOLT & OKAZAKI
39 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-3555

Robert B. Hansen
838-18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 322-5804
Attorney for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondent

/'

co:r.

^9

IN THE COURT OF APPEAI S FOR THE STATE OF UTA H

KELLY HOWARD,
Appellant,
Case No. 890073
(Priority Or tier - Mb)
ROBERT E. BUHLER,
Respondent«

APPEAL
From the Order of the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
State of Utah
Honorable James S. Sawaya

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Donald J. Purser
M. Taylor Florence
PURSER, OVERHOLT & OKAZAKI
39 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 53 2-3 555
Attorneys for Respondent

Robert B. Hansen
838-18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 322-5804
Attorney for Appellant

PARTIES

Kelly Howard
Robert E. Buhler

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PARTIES

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

DETERMINATIVE LAW

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A.

Nature of the Case

B.

Course of Proceedings and

C.

2

Disposition Below

2

Statement of Facts

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

4

ARGUMENT
A.

4

B.

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
A FINDING OF ORAL ACCEPTANCE OF AN $8,000
OFFER AND THE OFFER WAS CONDITIONAL UPON
SIGNING OF A WRITTEN RELEASE WHICH WAS
NEVER SIGNED .

4

CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOULD BE
REQUIRED DEGREE OF PROOF IN INSURANCE
CLAIMS TO PROVE AN ORAL ACCORD

10

CONCLUSION

12

ADDENDUM
Memorandum Decision

.

A--1,2

Order, Findings and Entry of Judgment

-ii-

.....

B-1,2,3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Allen v. Bissinqer & Co..
219 P539 (Utah 1923)

8

Brown v. Brown.
744 P2d 333 (Utah App. 1987)

11

Holder v. Holder,
340 P2d 761 (Utah 1959)

11

Jaramillo v. Farmers Insurance Group.
669 P2d 1231 (Utah 1983)

8

Lawrence Construction & Co..
642 P2d 382

8

Suaarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson.
610 P2d 1369 (Utah 1980)

8

-iii-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is brought pursuant to the provisions of Article
VIII, Sections
Rules

3

Plaintiff

and

3 and 5 of
4

of

the Utah Constitution and pursuant to

the Rules

of the

Utah

Court

of Appeals.

appeals from the Third Judicial District Court's entry

of Judgment in favor of Respondent.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES.

None

-1-

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW*
Did the

trial court

plaintiff's claims

err

when

it

for bodily injury

entered

were

judgment

that

barred by accord and

satisfaction?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of Case
On November 9, 1985

Kelly Howard was injured in a

two

car automobile collision in which Robert E. Buhler was the driver
of the other vehicle.
between Howard
carrier

After various contacts

and the insurance adjustor for Buhler's insurance

Howard brought

claims.

and communications

suit

Buhler asserted,

for

personal

injuries

and other

among other defenses, the affirmative

defense of accord and satisfaction (RIO).
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
The

7

and

8,

case was tried to the Court without a jury on June

1988.

requested

that

At

Howard

Respecting

Accord and

(R245-25).

Howard

195).

On

the

conclusion

respond

filed

the trial

Buhler7s

Satisfaction Defense

Trial
dated

his response on June

June 17, 1988 Buhler

Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum
(R196-207).

to

of

filed

Respecting

his

Court

Memorandum

June 7, 1988

15,

1988 (R180-

Defendant's Reply to

Accord and Satisfaction

On September 21, 1988 the Honorable James

filed a Memorandum Decision

the

in favor of Buhler

S. Sawaya

(R242,243).

On

*Another issue may be presented pursuant to Rule 2 R.Ut. App. Ct.

-2-

October
290).

13,

1988

the judgment appealed from was entered (R288-

On November

4,

1988

Howard

filed his Notice of

Appeal

(R303).
C.

Statement of Facts
In the first contact that Howard had

on

November

12,

1985,

the

adjustor

for

with Ms. Kirchoff
Buhler's

carrier, Howard gave her a statement of the accident
her then that he had "spoke with an
recorded
sent

(T43,95,104).

Howard

(T43,96).
return

a release

attorney" (T104),

which she

Thereafter on January

24, 1986 Kirchoff

form

claim for

forward

signed and returned

consulted with

his

obtain legal service
the sum

Howard told

to

settle

the

$2,844

She advised Howard that "When I received that back

mail, I would

never

insurance

the

present

a check" (T97).

(T98,99).

On

counsel and

May

The release
29, 1986

by
was

Howard

then learned he

could

on a contingent fee basis without charge on

insurance carrier was willing to pay if their offer

was in writing (Ex.43).

On July 8, 1986, after Howard decided to

go into a lighter line of work as recommended by his

doctor

and

take a computer course costing $3,700 to qualify him for computer
work, Kirchoff made
In

a settlement offer

doing so she "discussed

computer school contract for
He would

of $8,000

(T99, Ex.13).

the release that I would
$3,700.

need,

the

I would forward a release.

return it by mail, sign the release, have it notarized.

Upon receipt of the release in our office, I would forward him
check

and

conclude

the matter."

(T102)

On

August

6,

a

1986

Kirchoff sent Howard a letter requesting that he send the release
•3-

(T102, Ex.12).
advised

On

August

that written proof

being sent to him (Ex.44).
$8,000

7,

of an $8,000 insurance
A contingent fee,

was signed by Howard

never signed
suit on

(Ex.13).

October 9,

1986 he called his attorney

August

was

contract excluding

18, 1986 (Ex.44).

Buhler was served

1986 (T110).

company

and

with

It

summons in

was
this

Kirchoff never told him before

that date that this case had been settled (T110).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court

erred

in

determining that Howard accepted

the offer of $8,000 rather than only indicating that at that time
he

was "ready to

facts

to

settle" since the

which Buhler's adjustor

quoted words were the

testified

comments and especially in view of his not

to

regarding

only
his

signing and returning

two release forms that the adjustor said he'd have to sign before
she paid him.
The preponderance of

the evidence is

there was

no accord.

In any event this Court should require the higher degree of proof
of clear

and convincing

evidence to

find an accord in settling

insurance claims.

ARGUMENT
A.

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT

ORAL ACCEPTANCE OF AN

TO

SUPPORT A FINDING OF

$8,000 OFFER AND THE OFFER WAS CONDITIONAL

UPON SIGNING OF A WRITTEN RELEASE WHICH WAS NEVER SIGNED.

-4-

In

Paragraph No. 2 of

which were not

a mixture of facts

and

conclusions

separated (R289) the Court states that "plaintiff

accepted the settlement figure of $8,000 on July 8, 1986."
is no evidence to support any finding of fact
conclusion of law.
witness on
date.

to justify

In only one part of the record does

this point

testify as

to what

There
such a

Buhler's

Howard said on

that

Her quote as to his statement was "I am ready." (T181)

that point in time he had

consulted

with

counsel

and

he

At
was

"ready", ready to either settle the case or to go to court if the
settlement offered was not what the
have

the benefit

then and

claim was worth.

He did not

of his counsel's evaluation of an $8,000 offer

he obviously intended

to

obtain it

before making his

decision (Ex.43,44).
Although Buhler had the burden of proof on this issue he did
not present any proof as to what was actually said in the form of
a

telephone

recording,

previously recorded their

even

though

initial

call

the

adjustor

involved

concerning the facts of

the case.
The adjustor had made it clear to Howard that he had to sign
the release form she

sent him

justified in relying

on

particularly

since

offer of $2,844 which
him (T105).

The

before he could be

her representation

there was no effort to
the adjustor

evidence was

settled the case (T49 and T105).
-5-

He was

in

that regard and

hold

him to a prior

claimed was also accepted by

in conflict as

told Kirchoff that he was going to

paid.

to whether Howard

consult an attorney before he
Jay Wood corroborated Howard's

testimony on this point (T121,122).
Much
sent

was made

to

at trial of Exhibit 14

Kirchoff at Howard's

request on

a statement Jay Wood
August 8, 1986

which

reads as follows:
"Enclosed is the contract from the school which I
am attending (Mountainwest College).
Please send me my release form for $8,000.00 on
which we agreed."
There is no doubt from the evidence that

Kirchoff

needed a

copy of the computer school contract before she would be
settle and that

Howard needed

a

written

offer

before his attorney would make an exclusion
fee

contract if

of

from

the offer were inadequate.

able to

settlement

his contingent

This

need

for an

exchange is what that note was all about.
The
Howard

most telling proof

of

the $8,000

that

telephone

Kirchoffs letter of August 6,

there
offer

1986

was
on

no

July

in which

acceptance by
8,

1986

was

she states, inter

alia, "If you are still interested in settling vour claim, please
provide American Concept

with a

copy of your education contract

so that we may conclude this matter" (Ex.12)(underscoring added).
The preponderance of the

evidence is against

an accord and

satisfaction for the following reasons:
1.

No

told Howard

release

was signed

that would be

in this case although Kirchoff

required

before

he

could be

paid.

(Ex.13, T <a>)
2s
at

a

Howard and Kirchoff had previously discussed settlement
different figure

and

Kirchoff

-6-

claimed

they had reached

accord but the formal release was not signed and Kirchoff did not
seek

to

would

enforce it (thus leading Howard

not be an

(196,97)

Plaintiff consulted with

knew he could pursue any
attorney

that there

enforceable settlement until the formal release

had been signed).
3.

to believe

counsel

on May 29, 1986

claim that was not deemed

without paying a

fee

on the

fair

and

by his

sum offered in

writing.

made of the remarks of the

claimant

(Ex.43)
4.

No

recording was

although the adjustor had previously
claimants

oral statements

and

made

a

recording

claimant knew that.

of

the

(T104

and

absence of proof of recording "settlement discussion.)
5.

Kirchoff did not testify that plaintiff actually agreed

to settle his claims for $.8,000.00 (can't cite to the negative).
6.
8,

1986

Kirchoff did not follow up the phone conference of July
in which

she

claims plaintiff

agreed

$8,000.00 with any confirming letter or other
at that time.
7.

for

documentation sent

(Id.)

On August 6, 1986 Kirchoff wrote plaintiff in pertinent

part as follows: "Jf
claim, please
education

to settle

you

provide

contract

are still interested

American
so

we

Concept
may

with a

conclude

in settling your
copy
this

of

your

matter."

(underscoring added)(Ex.12)
8.

Kirchoff had not followed up on the above letter by the

time Buhler was

served

with process in this suit which occurred

on the 9th day of October, 1986 and she never told me before then
-7-

that she'd settled the case.
In the court below Buhler's
an

accord on

the

facts of

counsel urged the Court to find

this

case by

following

the

four

Sucrarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610

P2d

1369

following precedents:
(1)
(Utah 1980).
(2)

Jaramillo v. Farmers Insurance Group, 669 P2d 1231

(Utah 1983).
(3)

Allen v. Bissinaer & Co., 219 P539 (Utah 1923).

(4)

Lawrence Construction Co. v. Holmquist,

642

P2d

382.
As

for

(1) , deals

almost entirely with

the

question

of

"consideration," that being the fourth element it listed as being
essential to
or a

an Accord and Satisfaction (element 3 being "assent

meeting of minds," which

instant

case—was stated

as

is

the critical

being present

element

there and

on the
thus not

discussed.
As for (2), the facts were not in dispute.
were stipulated
found
and

to.

In a

three

to two

The facts there

decision the majority

that there* was a conflict between the stipulation of facts
the

release

controlling and

in evidence

and

held

that

that a prior precedent of that

the
Court

former

would not

alter the legal effect of the parties agreement to settle
contrary to that precedent (the Ivie case which
no fault law does
subrogation

not confer on

to funds received

by
-8-

was

a case

held that Utah's

a no-fault insurer the right of
its

insured

in a subsequent

action against the tort feasor.
As for (3), the

accord was

based on correspondence and the

Court said "there is no substantial conflict in the evidence, the
most

important part of which consists of written

between the parties."
bar where

This is in sharp contrast with the case at

the critical communications

writing and

communications

the testimony

is

are oral

rather

diametrically opposed as

than in
to

the

substance of the phone conversations in question.
As for (4), the issue was whether the settlement was subject
to

certain conditions.

There the party

held

to an oral accord

actually signed the Stipulation (but three days
deadline) and

the Court noted

(P.383) that "neither the

nor the Stipulation specifically states
contingent

on

there enforced

those conditions."

agreement.

all

what Howard said

as to

trial

said

that

the

letter

the settlement was

Although an

there was no dispute as to

prior oral

after the stated

what

oral accord was
was said in the

In the instant case there is no proof at

evidence

(disregarding his own

must be

reviewed in

testimony at

the light

most

favorable to the prevailing party) only the adjustor's conclusion
that he had accepted.
None of

the foregoing cases

party stating he is "ready to

hold

or

even

imply that one

settle" is equivalent to saying "I

accept your offer of $8,000" or words to that effect.
case is one of
case

adjustors

initial

impression

henceforth

take

settlement.
-9-

Thus, this

and one likely to lower
to be

sure a

the

settlement is a

Buhler

in

his post-trial brief went outside the record

quoting from a deposition he took of Howard.

in

This is quoted here

to

contrast the type of factual statement which would constitute

an

oral acceptance

this

record.

with the total absence of such

There

Buhler's

counsel

evidence

in

asked this hypothetical

question:
"If you called her (Kirchoff) up and said 'I want
to settle this case for $8,000/ and you discussed your
school contract and she said 'okay, send me the school
contract and I'll send you a release and we can
conclude your claim' as you never said anything more to
her, do you think it's reasonable for her to believe
that you
settled your claim?"
(R199,200)
Over
objection Howard answered affirmatively. (R200)
B.

CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOULD BE REQUIRED DEGREE

OF PROOF IN INSURANCE CLAIMS TO PROVE AN ORAL ACCORD.
Sound policy considerations
an insurance

adjustor's

uncorroborated

settled his or her claim by
many claimants mciy
illustration of

never

this

have

Court

claim that the claimant

an oral statement

alone.

Otherwise

"their day in court."

A recent

applying such

stipulation recorded in a deposition

caution

even

to which a party's

of Brown v. Brown. 744 P2d 333

to

a

counsel

agreed

is

1987).

Admittedly there is no stipulation involved in this case.

Even so the

the case

impel caution in accepting

principle of

requiring

evidence to be

(Utah

App.

more than a

preponderance should be required in those classes of cases where,
as here, there
detection by

could be

an

advantage

the more experienced

adjustor.

-10-

unfairly

person

such

taken

without

as an insurance

No
of

Utah case has ever

preponderance

applies

decided whether the usual civil rule
in a

case

settlement of an insurance claim.
of

the

The

an oral

requiring

oral acceptance by voice

contract

of

imposition by this Court

standard of clear and convincing evidence

salutary effect of
an

of

would

have a

insurance companies to corroborate
recordings,

witnesses to the statements made,

confirmation

contemporaneous

by other

documentation

or whatever satisfies the higher degree of proof.
Our Supreme Court in the case of Holder v. Holder. 340
761

(Utah

convincing
suit

1959) increased the
to

proof

required

proof from

beyond a reasonable doubt in

clear

P.2d
and

an annulment

involving a question of paternity for comparable reasons of

public policy to those Howard respectfully urges upon

this Court

to establish where no prior degree has yet been established,
to

settle

this case

for $8,000' and

you discussed your school

contract and she said 'okay, send me the school contract and I'll
send you a release

and we can conclude your claim' as

you never

said anything more to her, do you think its reasonable for her to
believe that you settled your claim?"

(R199, 200)

In the reply memorandum Buhler's counsel states "When judged
by an objective
he had settled

standard all conduct of Plaintiff indicated that
this case with Ms. Kirchoff." Howard respectfully

points out that his following conduct
settled

this case

with Ms. Kirchoff:

does not indicate
(1) he

Kirchoff at

that

time

recall to give

(T104), (2) He obtained a
-11-

had

consulted with an

attorney in November 1985 whose name he could not
Ms.

he

proposed

written contingent fee contract from his present
29, 1986 (Ex. 43),
contingent fee

(3) On August 15, 1986

he

attorney on May
signed a

written

contract with his present counsel (Ex.44), (4) He

did not sign, notcirize or return to

the insurance

written

to sign before she could pay

release she said he's have

him (R227), (5)

He

October 8, 1986.

caused process to be

adjustor

the

served upon Buhler

on

(R5)

In the same memorandum Buhler's counsel contends it is clear
"even

beyond

a reasonable

binding accord

and

Buhler ought not to
lesser standard

doubt that Plaintiff entered

satisfaction

in

this

case."

into a

Accordingly,

object to the application in this case

of a

of "clear and convincing" in deciding whether an

accord was proved.

CONCLUSION
The

evidence

is

insufficient

alternatively, the preponderance of
accord.

Alternatively

to

all

require

as

of

public

a

matter

to

find

an

accord

and,

the evidence is there was no

of the

above

the

Court should

policy that oral

insurance case should require proof that is clear and

accords

in

convincing

rather than a mere preponderance.
Howard respectfully requests

this

trial court's entry of judgment based on
and

remand

the

case

to

trial

-12-

court

to set aside

the

accord and satisfaction

court for

findings

of

fact,

conclusions

of

lav

and judgment as

to issues of liability and

damages.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of August, 1989.

o~Q*±J\

Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Appellant
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This is to certify that on the 7th day of August, 1989, four
true and correct

copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were

hand-carried by undersigned, to:

Donald J. Purser
M* Taylor Florence
PURSER, OVERHOLT & OKAZAKE
39 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Robert E. Buhler
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT " -/
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KELLY HOWARD,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. C-86-7662

vs.
ROBERT E. BUHLER,
Defendant.

The issues of this case were tried before the Court, sitting
without a jury, commencing June 7, 1988.

Robert B. Hansen, Esq.

appeared on behalf of plaintiff, and Donald J. Purser, Esq. and
M. Taylor Florence, Esq. of Purser, Okazaki and Berrett, appeared
on behalf of the defendant.

The matter was fully presented,

argued and submitted, and the Court's decision thereon taken
under advisement.
and

arguments

of

The Court having now considered the evidence
counsel,

together

with

written

Memoranda

submitted, now makes its decision and ruling thereon as follows:
This is a personal injury case resulting from an automobile
collision.

The issues of liability, causation and damages were

presented, as well as the defendant's affirmative defense of
accord and satisfaction.

It was stipulated by counsel and agreed

by the Court that the issue of accord and satisfaction would be
considered by the Court, and if defendant prevailed on that

A-l

HOWARD V. BUHLER

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

issue, that it would be dispositive of all other issues.

Counsel

has presented written Memoranda in support of their respective
positions, and the Court has reviewed the same.
The Court on the issue of the affirmative defense of accord
and

satisfaction

grounds
defendant

finds, based

stated

in

and

rules

satisfaction.

upon

defendant's
that

the

reasons

Memorandum,

there was,

in

in fact,

and

for

the

favor

of

the

an accord

and

Based upon this ruling, the Court determines that

it is dispositive to all other issues of the case.
Counsel for defendant is requested to prepare an appropriate
Order and Findings consistent with the Court's ruling in this
matter.
Dated this

21st

day of September^ 1988.:

J3MFS S. SAWAYA
DrOTRICT COURT JUDG^ j y r: r -

&f

~~'

A-2

Deploy Clem

fM>° * •>

OCT 13 3 2oPH*88

Donald J. Purser, 2663
M. Taylor Florence, 4835
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT
A Professional Corporation
39 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-3555
Attorneys for Defendant Buhler

-'•'V*nir

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Q.\M3ao<&

KELLY HOWARD,
Plaintiff,

ORDER, FINDINGS AND
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

vs.
ROBERT E. BUHLER,

Civil No. C86-7662
(Judge James S. Sawaya)

Defendant.

On June 7, 1988, the above-referenced parties regularly
appeared before the Court at the trial of this matter.

Robert

B. Hansen, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff, and Donald
J. Purser, Esq. and M. Taylor Florence, Esq. of Purser, Okazaki &
Berrett, P.C. appeared on behalf of the Defendant.

Both parties

proceeded to put on evidence in their respective cases in chief.
The matter was fully presented, argued and submitted, and the
courts decision thereon taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the evidence and arguments of
counsel, as well as the written memorandum submitted and all

other documents of record in this case, thereafter submitted its
memorandum decision dated September 21, 1988, finding in favor of
Defendant on his affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction.
In support of said decision, the following findings of fact are
submitted:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This

automobile

is

a

collision

personal
on

injury

November

9,

case

resulting

1985.

The

from

an

issues

of

liability, causation and damages were presented during the trial
of this matter, as well as Defendant's affirmative defense of
accord and satisfaction.

It was stipulated by counsel and agreed

by the Court that the issue of accord and satisfaction would be
considered by the court, and if Defendant prevailed on the issue,
that it would be dispositive of all other issues.
2.

The Court, on the issue of the affirmative defense of

accord and satisfaction, finds that on July 8, 1986, Christine
Kirchoff,

on behalf

of

Defendant's

liability

insurer

offered

Plaintiff the amount of $8,000.00 as settlement of all claims
arising out of the automobile accident at issue herein.

On or

about this same date, Plaintiff accepted the settlement figure in
the amount of $8,000.00.

Therefore, the parties expressed a

mutual

of

assent

or

meeting

the

minds with

regard

to

this

settlement figure and a binding accord and satisfaction had been
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achieved.
3.

The Court further finds that the settlement of the

claims arising

out of the automobile

accident herein

is the

proper subject matter for an accord and satisfaction and that the
parties thereto were competent to enter into such an agreement.
Finally, the Court finds that there was valid consideration in
the agreement to settle a disputed, uncertain cause of action
sufficient to create a binding accord and satisfaction.
4.

The

finding

of a valid

accord

and

satisfaction

is

dispositive of this case and the Court, therefore, need not reach
the issues of liability, causation and/or damages with respect to
the personal injury claims herein.
5.

Accordingly,

it is hereby

ordered

that judgment be

entered against Defendant, Robert E. Buhler, for the amount of
$8,000.00.
6.

On file with the court and dated January 15, 1988, is a

Notice of Offer of Judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure in the amount of $16,000.

In as much as the

judgment finally obtained by Plaintiff in this case was
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